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Abstract
This paper suggests how the targeting efﬁ  ciency of government programmes may be better 
assessed. Using the “pro-poor policy” (PPP) index developed by the authors, the study 
investigates not only the pro-poorness of government programmes geared to the poorest segment 
of the population but also basic service delivery in education, health and infrastructure. The paper 
also shows that the targeting efﬁ  ciency for a particular socio-economic group should be judged 
on the basis of a ‘total-group PPP index’, to capture the impact of operating a programme for the 
group. Using micro-unit data from household surveys, the paper presents a comparative analysis 
for Thailand, the Russian Federation, Viet Nam and 15 African countries.
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For about the last two decades, the consensus has been that economic growth is necessary but is, in itself, 
not sufﬁ  cient for the alleviation of poverty. Other than growth, poverty alleviation requires additional ele-
ments. First, poor households need to build up their asset base in order to participate in the growth pro-
cess. Second, growth needs to be more broad-based to reach all segments of society, including the poor. 
Third, short-term public assistance measures are required to protect vulnerable groups of society, because 
it takes time for the needy to beneﬁ  t from the impact of a policy or strategy.
Implementing this agenda to reduce poverty requires methods or tools that can effectively reach 
poor households or individuals. One way of accomplishing this is by public spending on items like 
universal education, which can reach all segments of society, including the poor. Alternatively, it can be 
achieved through a direct transfer of resources to the poor. However, in practice, problems commonly 
arise because of the scarcity of resources. With ﬁ  xed budgets, governments are often forced to make a 
decision to direct resources to speciﬁ  c groups of households or individuals in society. Targeting speciﬁ  c 
groups will achieve the maximum impact from a given budget or minimize budgetary costs to achieve 
a given impact. The attraction is particularly strong for transfer programmes that constitute safety nets 
because such transfers provide a beneﬁ  t that is largely a private good for recipient households.
While targeting has its own merits, there are a number of methods that can provide resources to a 
particular group. Whereas the existing literature largely focuses on descriptions of individual programmes, 
comparative analyses tend to cover a single region or method of intervention (Grosh, 1994; Braithwaite, 
Grootaert and Milanovic, 2000; Bigman and Fofack, 2000; Rawlings, Sherburne-Benz and Domelen, 
2001). A partial approach of this kind is not helpful for making broader assessments about the effective-
ness of different targeting methods. This paper attempts to provide a general framework to evaluate the 
targeting efﬁ  ciency of government welfare programmes and to draw lessons from developing country 
experiences that are relevant for policy making.
A government programme may be deﬁ  ned as pro-poor if it provides greater beneﬁ  ts to the poor 
compared to the non-poor. Suppose there are two programmes, A and B, incurring the same cost, then A 
will be more pro-poor than B if it leads to greater poverty reduction than B. Utilizing this deﬁ  nition, Kak-
wani and Son (2005) developed a new index called the “pro-poor policy (PPP)” index, which measures 
the pro-poorness of government programmes as well as of basic service delivery in education, health and 
infrastructure.
The PPP index is derived as the ratio of actual proportional poverty reduction from a government 
programme to the proportional poverty reduction that would have been achieved if every individual in 
society had received exactly the same beneﬁ  ts from the programme. Having been developed to improve 
targeting, the PPP index provides a means to assess the targeting efﬁ  ciency of government programmes. 
Furthermore, Kakwani and Son (2005) developed two types of PPP indices for socio-economic groups, 
namely “within-group” and “total-group” PPP indices. While the within-group PPP index measures the 
pro-poorness of a programme within a group, the total-group PPP index captures the impact of operating a 2  DESA Working Paper No. 13
programme in a group on its pro-poorness at the national level. The argument is based on the premise that 
the targeting efﬁ  ciency of a particular group should be judged on the basis of a total-group PPP index.1 
Using micro-unit-record data from household surveys, the proposed methodology is applied to Thailand, 
the Russian Federation, Viet Nam and 15 African countries.
The paper is organized in the following manner. The ﬁ  rst section presents a brief description of 
the methodology proposed by Kakwani and Son (2005) in a non-technical manner. It outlines the poverty 
measures used in the paper; the deﬁ  nition of the PPP index; the values of the PPP index attainable under 
perfect targeting; and the PPP index by socio-economic group. Technical derivation is left out in this 
paper as it is detailed in Kakwani and Son (2005). While the following section presents empirical results 
for Thailand, Russia and Viet Nam, the penultimate section provides empirical analysis for 15 African 
countries. The ﬁ  nal section summarizes the major ﬁ  ndings emerging from the study.
Methodology
Poverty measures
We measure the pro-poorness of a government policy by measuring its impact on poverty. If there are 
two policies, A and B, then policy A is more (less) pro-poor than policy B if it achieves a greater (smaller) 
reduction in aggregate poverty with a given cost. Aggregate poverty can be measured in a variety of ways. 
In this paper, we will focus on a class of additively separable poverty measures. Foster, Greer and Thor-
becke (1984) have suggested poverty measures that fall into this class. These include: a headcount ratio, 
estimating the percentage of people living below a poverty threshold; a poverty gap ratio, capturing the 
depth of poverty; and the severity of poverty index.
To formulate a poverty reduction policy, we need to make a choice of poverty measure. For in-
stance, addressing the headcount ratio will require policies different than those for addressing the poverty 
gap ratio or the severity of poverty index. The headcount ratio is a crude measure of poverty because it 
completely ignores the gaps in incomes from the poverty line and the distribution of income among the 
poor. The severity of poverty index has all the desirable properties.
Pro-poor policy (PPP) Index
Suppose there is a welfare transfer from the government which leads to an increase in the recipients’ 
income or consumption expenditure. Accordingly, there will be a reduction in poverty due to the increase 
in income. We deﬁ  ne a government programme to be pro-poor if the poor receive greater absolute beneﬁ  ts 
from it than the non-poor. This means that the pro-poor government programme should achieve greater 
poverty reduction compared to a counter-factual situation where everyone receives exactly the same ben-
eﬁ  t from the programme.
The PPP index is deﬁ  ned as the ratio of actual proportional poverty reduction from the pro-
gramme to the proportional poverty reduction that would have been achieved if every individual in society 
had received exactly the same beneﬁ  ts (equal to the average beneﬁ  t from the programme). A programme 
is called pro-poor (or anti-poor) when the PPP index is greater (or less) than unity. The larger the value of 
the PPP index, the greater the degree of pro-poorness of the programme.
1  It is possible that a programme may be well-targeted within group although it may not be considered as well-tar-
geted at the national level. Evaluating and Targeting Efficiency of Government Programmes  3
To calculate the PPP index, the programme does not have to involve cash transfers. As a matter of 
fact, a large number of government programmes consist of providing various services in the areas of edu-
cation, health and other social services. Although these services do not provide cash to individuals, they 
do contribute to their standard of living. Hence, it can be assumed that if a person utilizes a government 
service, then he/she receives some notional cash. If all individuals who utilize a government service are 
assumed to receive exactly the same beneﬁ  ts (in the form of notional cash), then we can easily calculate 
the PPP index.
Perfect targeting
The PPP index has the lowest value of zero if the government programme does not reduce any poverty at 
all, which will happen when all beneﬁ  ts of the programme go to the non-poor. This is considered to be the 
extreme situation of imperfect targeting.
On the other hand, perfect targeting may be deﬁ  ned as a situation where only the poor get all the 
beneﬁ  ts proportional to the income shortfall from the poverty line. Kakwani and Son (2005) deﬁ  ne two 
different values of the PPP index obtainable under perfect targeting, depending upon how one deﬁ  nes the 
poverty line. One scenario is where every household has a different poverty line depending on the house-
hold composition and the prices faced by that household. In our empirical study of Thailand, the ofﬁ  cial 
poverty line varies with households, whereas for Viet Nam the poverty line is ﬁ  xed for all households. In 
each case, the value of the PPP index under perfect targeting is deﬁ  ned differently.
In practice, it is not possible to attain perfect targeting because it is difﬁ  cult to determine people’s 
incomes or consumption accurately. We generally resort to proxy targeting, such as by geographical 
region or by other socio-economic characteristics of households. In this study, the targeting efﬁ  ciency of a 
programme is judged on the basis of the value of the PPP index. The value of the PPP index under perfect 
targeting may be used as a benchmark to assess the targeting performance of government programmes. 
This methodology can also be used for ex ante formulation of new government programmes.
PPP index by socio-economic group
Taking the line of reasoning a step further, a decomposition methodology was proposed to explain the 
PPP index in terms of two factors: the within-group PPP index and the total-group PPP index. Suppose 
there are k mutually exclusive socio-economic groups. The within-group PPP index measures the degree 
of pro-poorness of a programme within the kth group. It does not tell us whether targeting the kth group 
will necessarily lead to a pro-poor outcome at the national level. Since our objective is to achieve the 
maximum reduction of poverty at the national level, we need to see the impact of targeting the kth group 
on national poverty. To capture this effect, another PPP index for the kth group was proposed, called the 
total-group PPP index.
The total-group PPP index shows that the pro-poor policy index for the whole country is the 
weighted average of the pro-poor policy indices for individual groups, with weights proportional to the 
share of beneﬁ  ts received by each group. It was proved that to reduce poverty at the national level, operat-
ing the government programme in some groups will be more effective than in others. This efﬁ  ciency can 
be captured by the value of the total-group PPP index: the larger the value of the total-group PPP index, 
the more efﬁ  cient the kth group in reducing national poverty. On the whole, the methodology presented 
can help us to identify the efﬁ  cient groups from the viewpoint of improving targeting efﬁ  ciency.4  DESA Working Paper No. 13
 Thailand, Russia and Viet Nam
In this section, we apply our methodology, as brieﬂ  y outlined in the previous section, to Thailand, Russia 
and Viet Nam. While the PPP index is applied to Thailand and Russia to capture the extent to which the 
welfare schemes of those governments beneﬁ  t the poor, the PPP index is applied to Viet Nam to estimate 
the degree of effectiveness of basic services—including education and health—utilized by its population.
For all three countries, this study utilizes unit-record household surveys, and the analysis is based 
on per capita consumption expenditure. The surveys are nationwide and cover the periods 2000, 2002 
and 1997-1998 for Thailand, Russia and Viet Nam respectively. Poverty lines are country-speciﬁ  c. While 
a single average national poverty line is used for Viet Nam, Thai and Russian poverty lines differ across 
households because they take into account different needs of household members by gender and age, as 
well as the different spatial costs of living by region and area in both Thailand and Russia.2
Welfare programmes in Thailand and Russia
Thailand
In recent years, the Thai government has implemented a few social welfare programmes, including 
social pensions for the elderly, low income medical cards, health insurance cards and free school lunch 
programmes. These are means-tested and designed speciﬁ  cally to target the low-income group.3 In this 
section, we examine whether these welfare programmes have indeed beneﬁ  ted poor people in society by 
using the PPP index.
Table 1 presents the PPP index for Thailand’s social welfare programmes. As can be seen from 
the table, all four welfare programmes have a PPP index value greater than 1. Hence, we may conclude 
that all four welfare programmes beneﬁ  t the poor more than the non-poor. Overall, the poor have greater 
access to these government welfare programmes than the non-poor.
Interestingly, the welfare programmes for low income medical cards and free school lunches have 
higher PPP index values with respect to the severity of poverty measure. Since the severity of poverty 
measure gives greater weight to the ultra-poor, the absolute beneﬁ  ts of low income medical cards and free 
school lunch programmes ﬂ  ow to the ultra-poor more than to the moderately poor.
2  For a detailed discussion of Thai and Russian poverty lines, see Kakwani (2003, 2004).
3  In practice, no programme can be perfectly means tested. It is important to know how much the deviation of a 
programme is from the perfectly means tested programme. 
Table 1.
PPP index for welfare programmes in Thailand, 2000
Welfare schemes Poverty gap ratio Severity of poverty
Social pension for the elderly 1.68 1.54
Low-income medical cards 2.02 2.12
Health insurance cards 1.29 1.25
Free school lunches 2.02 2.06
Perfect targeting 6.77 10.31
Universal social pensions (for elderly over 65 years of age) 1.21 1.24Evaluating and Targeting Efficiency of Government Programmes  5
We also calculated the PPP index in the hypothetical case of a universal pension system. Suppose 
that every elderly person over 65 years of age gets a pension from the government. Is this scenario more pro-
poor than the actual pension system? The PPP index indicates that although a universal pension scheme for 
the elderly is pro-poor and is even more beneﬁ  cial to the ultra-poor, the present pension system is far more 
pro-poor than the universal one. This implies that the current means-tested pension system provides more 
beneﬁ  ts to the poor than the universal pension system for the elderly 65 years of age and over. In this analy-
sis, we have not taken into account the administrative costs involved in providing mean-tested pensions.
Perfect targeting is the ideal policy for poverty reduction. In practice, it is not feasible to oper-
ate such a policy because (i) the administrative cost is very high, and (ii) it is difﬁ  cult to obtain accurate 
details on individuals’ incomes or consumption, particularly in countries with large informal sectors. If the 
government in Thailand had succeeded in implementing perfect targeting, the PPP index would have been 
6.77 for the poverty gap and 10.31 for the severity of poverty measure. Thus, although pro-poor, the Thai 
welfare programmes have much lower PPP index values than the values that would have been obtained 
with perfect targeting. This suggests that there is scope for improving the targeting efﬁ  ciency of the Thai 
welfare programmes.
In the previous section, we mentioned two types of PPP indices by groups: the within-group PPP 
index and the total-group PPP index. As stated, the former measures the pro-poorness of a programme 
within the kth group, whereas the latter captures the impact of operating a programme in the kth group 
on its pro-poorness at the national level. The results are presented in table 2. The total-group PPP index 
shown in the table reveals that the welfare programmes are more pro-poor in the rural areas than in the 
urban areas. Welfare schemes, such as the health care cards and free school lunches, are not pro-poor in 
the urban areas. This suggests that the government expenditures made on these programmes in the urban 
areas did not beneﬁ  t the poor more than the non-poor.
It is, however, interesting to note that the within-group PPP index shows that all programmes are 
more pro-poor in the urban areas than in the rural areas. Thus, the two types of indices (total-group and 
within-group) present opposite results. The main reason for this is that welfare programmes in Thailand 
Table 2.
PPP index by urban and rural areas in Thailand, 2000
 
Welfare Schemes
Total-group PPP index Within-group PPP index
Urban Rural Urban Rural
  Poverty gap ratio
Social pension for the elderly 1.13 1.76 4.41 1.31
Low-income medical cards 1.44 2.10 5.60 1.56
Health insurance cards 0.70 1.39 2.72 1.03
Free school lunches 0.81 2.21 3.15 1.64
  Severity of poverty
Social pension for the elderly 1.18 1.60 5.42 1.17
Low-income medical cards 1.34 2.23 6.18 1.63
Health insurance cards 0.61 1.36 2.83 0.99
Free school lunches 0.73 2.27 3.37 1.666  DESA Working Paper No. 13
are better targeted in the urban areas than in the rural areas. Since the concentration of poor is higher in 
the rural areas, the impact of targeting the rural areas turns out to be more pro-poor at the national level. 
Thus, the two indices provide us with two different types of information about targeting. If our objec-
tive is to reduce poverty at the national level, then the efﬁ  ciency of targeting a particular group should be 
judged on the basis of the total-group PPP index.
Russia
Russia has a well-developed social beneﬁ  ts system, of which the pension is the largest component. Table 
3 shows the population receiving some kind of beneﬁ  t. There are some persons who receive more than 
one beneﬁ  t at the same time; those people are so small in number that we have not taken them into ac-
count here.
From table 3, it can be seen that out of the total population of 143.32 million, 53.62 million 
are receiving some kind of government beneﬁ  t, which means that 37.41 per cent of the total population 
receives government beneﬁ  ts. This shows that the Russian social beneﬁ  ts system is very large in terms of 
population coverage. The old-age pension is the largest welfare programme, beneﬁ  ting about 26.32 mil-
lion people. The second largest programme is the child allowance, beneﬁ  ting 17.42 million children. The 
disability pension is given to 3.19 million people.
The Russian government spends 46.79 billion rubles per month on welfare programmes (exclud-
ing administrative costs), of which 38.74 billion rubles go to the payment of pensions. The expenditure on 
child allowances is only 1.45 billion rubles, meaning that the child allowance per beneﬁ  ciary is only 83.1 
rubles per month. As the incidence of poverty among children is very severe, the child allowance is too 
small to have a signiﬁ  cant effect on poverty among children. The government pays average beneﬁ  ts equal 
to 326.5 rubles per person per month. Our average lower poverty line for Russia is 1055.9 rubles per person 
per month, which means that the government pays beneﬁ  ts equal to one third of the poverty line income.
To what extent do government beneﬁ  ts go to the poor compared to the non-poor in Russia? This 
question is answered through the proposed PPP index. Table 4 gives the empirical estimates of the pro-
Table 3.
Russian welfare systems, 2002




(billion rubles) Percentage share
Old-age pension 26.32 49.08 38.74 82.79
Disability pension 3.19 5.96 3.61 7.71
Loss-of-breadwinner pension 1.64 3.05 1.27 2.72
Social pension 0.27 0.5 0.26 0.56
Care for children under 18 months 0.84 1.57 0.41 0.88
Child allowances (under 16 years)  17.42 32.49 1.45 3.09
Unemployment beneﬁ  ts 0.45 0.84 0.31 0.65
Other beneﬁ  ts 0.95 1.77 0.20 0.42
Scholarships 2.55 4.76 0.55 1.17
All beneﬁ  ts 53.63 100.00 46.79 100.00Evaluating and Targeting Efficiency of Government Programmes  7
poorness of each of the government welfare programmes that are currently implemented in Russia. As 
can be seen from the table, the beneﬁ  ts as a whole have PPP index values far greater than 1. From this, 
we may conclude that the welfare system in Russia tends to beneﬁ  t the poor more than the non-poor. 
More importantly, the absolute beneﬁ  ts of the welfare system do indeed ﬂ  ow more to the ultra-poor than 
to the poor, as suggested by the value of the PPP index for the severity of poverty measure, equal to 3.90. 
Note that the PPP index for all beneﬁ  ts is the weighted average of the PPP indices for all 9 welfare pro-
grammes, with the weight proportional to the share of beneﬁ  ts accruing to people from each programme 
presented in the third column of table 3.
Table 4 also reveals that if the Russian Government had implemented perfect targeting, the PPP 
index would have been 3.02 and 5.71 for the poverty gap ratio and the severity of poverty index, respec-
tively. This suggests that although Russian welfare programmes are not perfectly targeted to the poor, 
their deviation from perfect targeting is not large.
It is important to note that welfare programmes such as the child allowance, given to those aged 
below 16 years, and scholarships are not particularly pro-poor for the severity of poverty index. This is 
evident from the result that the PPP indices of these two programmes for the severity of poverty measure 
fall far below unity. This suggests that the absolute beneﬁ  ts of these programmes do not ﬂ  ow to the ultra-
poor. It further suggests that these programmes may require better targeting than the current system in a 
way that favours the ultra-poor living far below the poverty threshold.
Health services in Viet Nam
Over the past decade or so, Viet Nam has enjoyed a signiﬁ  cant improvement in the standard of living with 
its impressive performance in growth and poverty reduction. More importantly, its growth process has 
been pro-poor in a way that the growth beneﬁ  ts the poor proportionally more than the non-poor (Kakwani 
and Son 2004). In this context, it will be interesting to see whether, along with a rising standard of living 
and its pro-poor growth, poor people beneﬁ  t from utilization of health services.
Table 4.
PPP indices for the Russian welfare system, 2002
Type of government beneﬁ  t Poverty gap ratio Severity of poverty
Old-age pension 2.20 4.13
Disability pension 2.18 4.16
Loss-of-breadwinner pension 2.09 2.40
Social pension 2.22 2.80
Care for children under 18 months 1.78 1.87
Child allowances (under 16 years)  1.19 0.79
Unemployment beneﬁ  ts 2.22 3.80
Other beneﬁ  ts 1.74 2.75
Scholarships 0.90 0.62
All beneﬁ  ts 2.14 3.90
Perfect targeting 3.02 5.718  DESA Working Paper No. 13
Table 5 presents the PPP index for utilization of various health facilities in Viet Nam. As the 
results in that table reveal, only the commune health centres have index values greater than 1. This sug-
gests that the poor overall have greater access to commune health centres than the non-poor. It seems that 
commune health centres play an important role in providing basic health services to the poor in Viet Nam. 
Unfortunately, commune health centres do not provide quality health services because they are gener-
ally poorly staffed and equipped. Thus, the poor are not receiving quality health services as these are not 
provided by the commune health centres.
Public hospitals in Viet Nam provide higher quality care and are mainly utilized by individuals 
with health insurance. Utilization of government hospitals has PPP index values far less than 1, imply-
ing that public hospitals provide greater beneﬁ  ts to the non-poor than to the poor. That being the case, the 
poor are less able to access the quality health services provided by public hospitals.
Nevertheless, it is not surprising that the utilization of health insurance is not pro-poor because 
those covered by health insurance have access to government hospitals. Moreover, insurance coverage un-
der the health insurance programme is more extensive for relatively better-off individuals. Having health 
insurance is positively correlated with the individual’s income: while the insurance coverage rate is 9.2 
per cent in the bottom income quartile, 24.5 per cent have health insurance in the top income quartile.
The results presented in table 5 indicate that pharmacy utilization is almost pro-poor (0.96 for the 
poverty gap ratio). It is reasonable to assume that more highly educated individuals, and hence presum-
ably those more aware of the risks of self-medication, avoid pharmacy visits. Pharmacy utilization there-
fore appears to be an inferior good for the high-income group since rich individuals go to public hospitals 
for their health care. On the other hand, pharmacy visits are a normal good for poor households.
Table 5 also reveals that, as indicated by the total-group PPP index, the utilization of three types 
of health facilities—commune health centres, pharmacies and Eastern medicine facilities—is more pro-
poor in rural areas than in urban areas. This suggests that the government subsidies on these health ser-
vices in the rural areas do beneﬁ  t poor people more than the non-poor. In addition, the within-group PPP 
Table 5. 






Total-group PPP index Within-group PPP index
Urban Rural Urban Rural
  Poverty gap ratio
Government hospitals 0.62 0.07 0.91 0.34 0.74
Commune health centres 1.17 0.27 1.23 1.38 1.00
Regional polyclinics 0.84 0.42 0.98 2.14 0.79
Eastern medicine facilities 0.96 0.04 1.15 0.21 0.94
Pharmacies 0.96 0.26 1.16 1.29 0.94
Private doctors 0.79 0.12 0.98 0.59 0.80
Health insurance 0.50 0.08 0.79 0.40 0.64
Perfect targeting 2.86Evaluating and Targeting Efficiency of Government Programmes  9
index indicates that, within the urban sector, sick and injured individuals from poor households receive 
far less beneﬁ  ts from the utilization of health care services such as government hospitals and Eastern 
medicine facilities. By comparison, the rural poor beneﬁ  t more from utilizing facilities such as commune 
health centres, Eastern medicine facilities and pharmacies.
Educational services in Viet Nam
In this subsection, we apply our proposed PPP index methodology to assess educational services 
in Viet Nam. Our prime objective is to ﬁ  nd out to what extent public education at primary and secondary 
levels is pro-poor. We also attempt to ﬁ  nd out whether free universal education will beneﬁ  t the poor more 
than the non-poor.
Table 6 reveals that public primary education beneﬁ  ts the poor more than the non-poor. Beneﬁ  ts 
provided by public primary education are even more pro-poor for the ultra-poor. This is supported by the 
fact that net enrolments in primary school increased from 87 to 91 per cent over the period 1993-1998 
(Nguyen, 2002). Coupled with this substantial improvement in primary school enrolment rates, changes 
in the allocation of public spending on education in the 1990s could have further favoured the lower levels 
of education. The share of public spending on education going to the poor increased from 16.5 per cent in 
1993 to 18.1 per cent in 1998 (Nguyen, 2002). Although public schools at the primary education level are 
found to be pro-poor, other types of schools at the same level are highly anti-poor. In other words, primary 
schools that are semi-public or sponsored by the private sector beneﬁ  t better-off children more than poor 
ones. This suggests that educational subsidies given to these types of schools are likely to beneﬁ  t the non-
poor more than the poor.
Table 6 also shows that lower secondary education in Viet Nam is not pro-poor, as indicated by 
the PPP index. This ﬁ  nding emerges consistently, irrespective of school type. At the lower secondary 
level, net enrolment rates more than doubled between 1993 and 1998, from 30 per cent to 62 per cent. 
However, for the population as a whole, 38 per cent of children aged 11-14 years old were not enrolled in 
lower secondary school, while 66 per cent of the poorest children in this age range were not enrolled in 
primary school. The disparity in enrolment rates between the richest and poorest quintiles has been highly 
signiﬁ  cant over the years.
Table 6.
PPP index for education services in Viet Nam, 1997-1998
School Types Primary Lower secondary Upper secondary
  Poverty gap ratio
Public 1.29 0.79 0.37
Semi-public 0.55 0.15 0.23
Sponsored 0.63 0.51 0.00
  Severity of poverty
Public 1.31 0.65 0.23
Semi-public 0.19 0.08 0.09
Sponsored 0.14 0.26 0.0010  DESA Working Paper No. 13
As would be expected, the PPP index shows that upper secondary schools in Viet Nam have far 
more children from better-off households compared to those from poor households. This is true for all 
types of schools at this level. There are no children from poor households enrolled in the upper secondary 
level schools sponsored by the private sector. Over the period 1993-1998, children from the poorest quin-
tile experienced an increase in enrolment in upper secondary schools from 1 to 5 per cent, as compared to 
an increase from 21 to 64 per cent for the richest quintile (Nguyen, 2002). On the whole, much still needs 
to be done to achieve universal primary and secondary education. The question is whether educational 
outcomes can be pro-poor. The PPP index for universal education is now compared to that under the cur-
rent education system.
Table 7 shows that universal education at primary and lower secondary levels in Viet Nam would 
provide more beneﬁ  ts to poor children than to the non-poor. The degree of pro-poorness of universal ac-
cess to primary education among 6 to 10-year-old children would be almost as high as actually achieved 
by the current education system. Similarly, if lower secondary education were made universal for chil-
dren aged between 11 and 14 years, this would provide a pro-poor outcome. This is in contrast with the 
actual situation, as indicated by the PPP index: the index is 0.79 for lower secondary education, whereas 
it would be 1.08 if lower secondary education were universal. At higher levels, universal provision is not 
likely to deliver pro-poor outcomes. The PPP index for upper secondary schooling is less than unity. In 
short, universal education at higher levels would not be pro-poor, but would provide greater opportunities 
to poor individuals aged between 15 and 17 years for upper secondary schooling to have greater access to 
higher education compared to the current situation. A better alternative would be to provide incentives to 
children from poor households to enrol in upper secondary education.
Basic infrastructure services in Viet Nam
Basic infrastructure services make signiﬁ  cant contributions to people’s well-being. Basic services, such as 
piped water and sanitation (e.g., sewerage systems, ﬂ  ushing toilets, etc.), have direct impacts on people’s 
health status and overall well-being. Having access to other services, such as electricity and telephones, 
helps households increase their productivity for income generation. A number of studies reveal that a 
household’s access to basic services is highly and signiﬁ  cantly correlated with a lower probability of be-
ing poor.
As shown in table 8, the beneﬁ  ts generated from all types of basic services go to the non-poor 
more than to the poor in Viet Nam. Poor households in general have much greater access to piped water 
and electricity than sanitary systems: the PPP index for water and electricity are 0.86 and 0.80, respec-
tively, when measured by the poverty gap ratio, whereas the indices are only 0.10 for the sanitary facili-
ties. As suggested in table 8, beneﬁ  ts generated from sanitary services (collected waste and ﬂ  ushing toilets 
in this case) are highly skewed in favour of the non-poor. The beneﬁ  ts of all types of basic services are 
Table 7. 
PPP index if universal  education were to be provided in Viet Nam
  Poverty gap ratio Severity of poverty
Primary 1.28 1.33
Lower secondary 1.08 1.06
Upper secondary 0.91 0.85Evaluating and Targeting Efficiency of Government Programmes  11
lower for the severity of poverty measure. This suggests that the ultra-poor have even less access to basic 
infrastructure services than the poor.
15 African countries
This section of our study utilizes unit-record household data sets from 15 African countries obtained from 
the African Household Survey Data Bank of the World Bank. The countries and years of the surveys are: 
Burkina Faso in 1998, Burundi in 1998, Cameroon in 1996, Côte d’Ivoire in 1998, Ethiopia in 2000, 
Gambia in 1998, Ghana in 1998, Guinea in 1994, Kenya in 1997, Madagascar in 2001, Malawi in 1997, 
Mozambique in 1996, Nigeria in 1996, Uganda in 1999 and Zambia in 1998.
The study uses national poverty lines for the 15 countries obtained from various poverty assess-
ment reports. These poverty lines were originally very crude and did not take into account different needs 
of household members by age and gender. Moreover, the poverty lines were not adjusted for the econo-
mies of scale which exist in large households. To overcome these shortcomings associated with the of-
ﬁ  cial poverty lines, Kakwani and Subbarao (2005) made some modiﬁ  cations to the national poverty lines, 
taking into account the different needs of household members and economies of scale.
Targeting children: targeting vs. universalism
According to Coady, Grosh and Hoddinott (2002), more than a quarter of targeted programmes in all de-
veloping countries had regressive beneﬁ  t incidences. For instance, they found that the poorest 40 per cent 
received less than 40 per cent of poverty alleviation budget expenditures. Such ineffective targeting of 
poor households suggests that the overall impact on poverty of such spending has been much smaller than 
if well targeted. Moreover, the administrative costs involved in implementing any targeted programmes 
are very high. Much of the budget is spent on simply getting the resources to poor families. Consequently, 
the cost per unit of income transferred can be substantial. Transfer programmes seem to be administra-
tively complex as they require resources to undertake targeting of transfers and to monitor the recipients’ 
actions. In this context, one might argue for a scenario of universal transfers.
In this section, we estimate the PPP indices under a universal transfer programme for children 
aged between 5 and 16 years old. Under such a programme, every child that belongs to this age group is 
assumed to receive a certain amount of transfers, irrespective of the child’s poverty status. The results are 
presented in ﬁ  gure 1 and table 9. From ﬁ  gures 1 and 2, we note that the PPP index values with perfect 
targeting for the 15 African countries are quite small compared to the PPP index values in Thailand, Rus-
sia and Viet Nam. In fact, the PPP indices with perfect targeting differ little from the indices associated 
with universal transfers. This suggests that targeting may not be needed in cases such as these 15 African 
countries, where poverty is extremely high.
Table 8. 
Viet Nam: PPP index for basic infrastructure services, 1997-1998
Access to basic infrastructure services Poverty gap ratio Severity of poverty
Electricity 0.80 0.71
Piped and tap water 0.86 0.81
Collected waste 0.10 0.07
Sanitary toilets 0.10 0.0512  DESA Working Paper No. 13
Table 9 carries two important messages. First, the results indicate that universal transfers will pro-
vide more absolute beneﬁ  ts to children from poor families than those from non-poor families. Second, a 
universal transfer scheme is likely to bring about an even more pro-poor outcome if implemented in rural 
areas where most poor children live. One exception is in the case of Nigeria where, in contrast, poverty is 
widespread in both urban and rural areas.
Figure 1:
Pro-Poor Policy indices under 
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One possible criticism is that we do not compare targeted transfers with universal transfers. 
Nevertheless, the main implication emerging from the PPP index is that if a transfer is given to every child 
aged between 5-16 years old, it is likely to provide more absolute beneﬁ  ts to poor children, particularly in 
rural areas. What is more, this analysis suggests that universal targeting of children may not be a bad pol-
icy option, particularly in rural areas. This may be more cost effective, as targeting only a small subgroup 
of children may result in a large portion of administrative costs being devoted to identifying the poor.
Summary
Kakwani and Son (2005) have proposed a new index called the “pro-poor policy” (PPP) index. This index 
measures the pro-poorness of government welfare programmes and basic service delivery of education, 
health and infrastructure. It is an attempt to introduce a methodology for assessing the techniques of tar-
geting to make it better suited for evaluation.
The conclusion reached was that the targeting efﬁ  ciency of a particular group should be judged 
on the basis of the total-group PPP index. If the objective is to reduce poverty, then social transfer pro-
grammes should be designed so that they lead to the maximum reduction of poverty under given resource 
constraints. To achieve this objective, perfect targeting would be an ideal solution. Two prerequisites are 
necessary in this context: only the poor get all the beneﬁ  ts, and beneﬁ  ts given to the poor are proportional 
to their income shortfalls from the poverty line income. To implement such a programme, it will be neces-
sary to have detailed information of people’s incomes or consumption expenditures. Such detailed infor-
mation and the administrative ability to use it are, of course, not present in most developing countries. The 
Table 9:
PPP index for universal transfers to rural and urban areas
Country




targeting Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total
Burkina Faso 1.18 0.43 1.07 1.81 1.21 0.38 1.08 2.53
Burundi 1.12 0.28 1.09 1.59 1.16 0.23 1.12 2.11
Cameroon 1.28 0.60 1.09 1.54 1.32 0.50 1.08 2.05
Côte d’Ivoire 1.51 0.60 1.10 2.51 1.63 0.45 1.09 3.63
Ethiopia 1.13 0.73 1.07 2.37 1.14 0.74 1.09 3.42
Gambia 1.37 0.65 1.08 1.56 1.56 0.39 1.08 2.00
Ghana 1.39 0.54 1.09 2.24 1.47 0.42 1.10 3.03
Guinea 1.42 0.37 1.08 2.56 1.47 0.31 1.10 3.40
Kenya 1.25 0.29 1.14 1.95 1.27 0.18 1.16 2.53
Madagascar 1.22 0.65 1.09 1.57 1.29 0.57 1.13 1.95
Malawi 1.17 0.18 1.07 1.52 1.21 0.09 1.09 1.93
Mozambique 1.19 0.62 1.07 1.42 1.24 0.59 1.11 1.77
Nigeria 1.14 1.13 1.14 1.54 1.12 1.21 1.16 1.91
Uganda 1.17 0.25 1.06 2.00 1.20 0.19 1.08 2.75
Zambia 1.23 0.76 1.05 1.45 1.34 0.57 1.06 1.8014  DESA Working Paper No. 13
policy makers, therefore, have to resort to a form of proxy targeting which makes transfers based on easily 
identiﬁ  able socio-economic characteristics of households; however, proxy targeting can never achieve 
complete targeting success. Hence, this study is an important methodological attempt to assess the target-
ing efﬁ  ciency of government programmes by trying to ﬁ  nd out how good the proxy targeting is compared 
to perfect targeting. Government programmes may be deﬁ  ned as pro-poor if they provide greater beneﬁ  ts 
to the poor than to the non-poor.
Using micro unit-record household surveys, the methodology was applied to 18 countries in-
cluding Thailand, Russia, Viet Nam and 15 African countries. The major conclusions emerging from our 
empirical analysis can be synthesized as follows:
First, all four welfare programmes recently implemented by the Thai government were found to 
be pro-poor. In particular, welfare programmes designed to help the very poor—including low income 
medical cards and free school lunches—were shown to be highly pro-poor, beneﬁ  ting the ultra-poor more 
than the poor. In addition, the study has shown that a universal pension for the elderly over 65 years of age 
is likely to be less pro-poor than the present old-age pension system. This suggests that the Thai govern-
ment should continue with its present old-age pension scheme.
Second, the study found that the welfare system in Russia tends to beneﬁ  t the poor more than the 
non-poor. Moreover, the absolute beneﬁ  ts of the welfare system do indeed ﬂ  ow more to the ultra-poor 
than to the poor, as suggested by the PPP index value for the severity of poverty index, which is higher 
than that for the poverty gap ratio. Additionally, the PPP index for all beneﬁ  ts is the weighted average of 
the PPP indices for all nine welfare programmes, with the weight proportional to the shares of each pro-
gramme. The study found the Russian welfare programmes to be reasonably well-targeted. This is evident 
from the ﬁ  nding that the PPP indices of welfare programmes are quite close to (but still lower than) the 
index expected to be attained with perfect targeting. The study also found that welfare programmes –such 
as the child allowance, given to those aged below 16 years, and scholarships– are not pro-poor for the 
ultra-poor in particular. This suggests that these programmes may require better targeting than the current 
system in a way that would favour the ultra-poor living far below the poverty threshold.
Third, basic services—health and education—in Viet Nam were found to be mostly not pro-poor. 
Although government hospitals provide the highest quality of health care, the poor are much less likely to 
utilize them. This is, however, not true for commune health centres, which appear to provide more servic-
es to individuals from poor households. Unfortunately, the commune health centres do not provide quality 
health services because they are poorly staffed and equipped. On the whole, the poor have less access to 
quality health care.
In Viet Nam, public primary schools were found to be pro-poor. This was partly due to the increase 
in public spending on education for the poor in the 1990s. However, secondary education was not pro-poor. 
The study suggests that universal education at primary and lower secondary levels could provide more ben-
eﬁ  ts to students from poor households, although this cannot be said for higher levels of education.
Fourth, ex ante simulations of universal transfers to school-age children in 15 African countries 
indicated that universal transfers would provide more absolute beneﬁ  ts to children from poor families than 
to those from non-poor families. In addition, the study found that a universal transfer scheme is likely to 
have even more pro-poor outcomes if implemented in the rural areas, where most poor children reside. Evaluating and Targeting Efficiency of Government Programmes  15
This ﬁ  nding is true for all the countries except Nigeria, where poverty is widespread in both urban and 
rural areas.
Finally, the study found that in the 15 African countries, the value of the PPP index with perfect 
targeting was quite small compared to the index values for Thailand, Russia and Viet Nam. The index 
value of perfect targeting for Thailand was far greater than for Russia and Viet Nam. In the case of the 
African countries, the PPP indices under perfect targeting differed little from the indices for universal pro-
vision. Therefore, we conclude that perfect targeting is not necessary for cases such as these 15 African 
countries, where poverty is extremely high.
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